07 When scrutiny arrived, Flock coached staff on the messaging

In late 2025, Flock’s cameras drew public attention — a resident submitted a security whitepaper documenting device vulnerabilities, a third-party website began aggregating ALPR search logs released through public-records requests, and Flock disclosed that some of its “Condor” video devices had a debug interface exposed on the open internet without password protection. Flock’s emails to Benicia staff repeatedly supplied talking points and urged staff to reassure the Council.

From: Lily Ho, Flock Safety — November 17, 2025 (responding to a resident’s vulnerability whitepaper forwarded by the city): “These are not material vulnerabilities, and both severity and likelihood to be exploited are low… This device in this whitepaper was not connected to the cloud and to the best of our knowledge not customer installed.”

From: Chris Colwell, SVP Customer Experience, Flock Safety — December 9, 2025 (“What you Need to Know About Recent Online Disclosures”): “To be clear: Flock has not been breached or compromised. We are CJIS compliant… We also encourage you to forward this information to others in your department or to councilmembers so they can be prepared for any potential questions.”

From: Chris Colwell — December 23, 2025 (“Update on Limited Condor Misconfiguration”): “The debug interface on a small number of Condor units was temporarily accessible on the internet without password protection… A website and a sensationalized YouTube channel inaccurately portrayed the extent of this access.”

Why it matters: The vendor’s own messaging shows a pattern of pre-empting oversight — supplying elected officials’ talking points and characterizing an internet-exposed, unauthenticated debug interface as immaterial.

Source: Re_ FW_ Benicia Must Reconsider…-Redacted.txt; What you Need to Know About Recent Online Disclosures.txt; Update on Limited Condor Misconfiguration.txt (PR-2026-7).